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Imperfect competition and the pricing of interbank payment services

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  • John A. Weinberg

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  • John A. Weinberg, 2002. "Imperfect competition and the pricing of interbank payment services," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 51-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2002:i:win:p:51-66
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    File URL: https://www.richmondfed.org/-/media/RichmondFedOrg/publications/research/economic_quarterly/2002/winter/pdf/weinberg.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mcandrews, James, 1998. "Direct presentment regulation in payments," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 311-326, September.
    2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: I. Overview and Nondiscriminatory Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 1-37, Spring.
    4. Takatoshi Ito, 1991. "The Japanese Economy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262090295, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos A. Arango-Arango & Yanneth Rocio Betancourt-Garcia, 2022. "A Mixed Duopoly in Interbank Payment Services," IHEID Working Papers 19-2022, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    2. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2003_016 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kemppainen, Kari, 2003. "Competition and regulation in European retail payment systems," Research Discussion Papers 16/2003, Bank of Finland.
    4. Kemppainen, Kari, 2003. "Competition and regulation in European retail payment systems," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 16/2003, Bank of Finland.

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