Un Modelo Integrado de Depredación y Colusión
We present a two-firm model of predation under complete information, based on different discount factors, and integrate it with a model of collusion. Competition, collusion and predation are seen as alternative strategies. The basic conclusions are that t
Volume (Year): 39 (2002)
Issue (Month): 116 ()
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