Oligopolistic Equilibrium and Financial Constraints
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- Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C. & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2011. "Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1110, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
- Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón & and Yosuke, 2011. "Oligopolistic Equilibrium and Financial Constraints," Working Papers 547, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel, 2013.
"Optimal collusion with limited liability,"
International Journal of Economic Theory,
The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 9(3), pages 203-227, September.
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- Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel, 2013. "Optimal Collusion with Limited Liability," Post-Print halshs-00755569, HAL.
- Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Arijit & Yang, Lei, 2014.
"On the Sustainability of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfection,"
60832, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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- Sugata Marjit & Arijit Mukherjee & Lei Yang, 2016. "Sustainabnility of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfections," CESifo Working Paper Series 6292, CESifo Group Munich.
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More about this item
KeywordsFinancial Constraints; Bankruptcy; Firm Behavior; Dynamic Games;
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2015-10-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-ENT-2015-10-25 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-HPE-2015-10-25 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-IND-2015-10-25 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2015-10-25 (Microeconomics)
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