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Microeconomic theories of imperfect competition

  • Jean J. Gabszewicz
  • Jacques-François Thisse

[fre] Cet article vise à offrir un panorama des théories de la concurrence imparfaite qui l'abordent du point de vue de la microéconomie. Cette présentation s'articule autour des quatre thèmes principaux qui caractérisent la concurrence imparfaite : la collusion, la différentiation des produits, les barrières à l'entrée et l'information imparfaite. Une section est aussi consacrée à la théorie de la concurrence imparfaite en équilibre général. [eng] This paper aims at providing an overview of what has been accomplished in the economics of imperfect competition. Our starting point is that imperfect competition arises when at least one of the four traditional assumptions of perfect competition is violated. In our review, we neglect the monopoly case and offer a brief survey of general equilibrium model with imperfect competition.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/cep.2000.1288
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File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/cep_0154-8344_2000_num_37_1_1288
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Cahiers d'économie politique.

Volume (Year): 37 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 47-99

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Handle: RePEc:prs:caecpo:cep_0154-8344_2000_num_37_1_1288
Note: DOI:10.3406/cep.2000.1288
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/cep

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