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Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria

  • Hausken, Kjell

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4NYSH4J-3/2/8b9538cb7db659b8515b8dacca60fec1
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 138-144

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:138-144
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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  1. Cripps,Martin & Scmidt,Klaus & Thomas,Jonathan, 1993. "Reputation in pertubed repeated games," Discussion Paper Serie A 410, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
  3. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-78, July.
  4. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Hausken, Kjell, 2005. "The battle of the sexes when the future is important," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 89-93, April.
  6. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  7. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1993. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Munich Reprints in Economics 3395, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  8. Garfinkel, M.R. & Skaperdas, S., 2000. "Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters," Papers 99-00-11, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
  9. Marco Celentani, 1993. "Maintaining a Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent," Discussion Papers 1075R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July.
  11. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
  12. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, June.
  13. D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
  14. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, June.
  15. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  16. Skaperdas, Stergios & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "Can the shadow of the future harm cooperation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 355-372, May.
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