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Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games

  • D. Abreu
  • D. Pearce
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    Paper provided by Economics Department, Princeton University in its series Princeton Economic Theory Papers with number 00f2.

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    Date of creation: Sep 2000
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    Handle: RePEc:wop:prinet:00f2
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    1. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
    2. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    3. Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in perturbed repeated games," Munich Reprints in Economics 20052, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine.
    5. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    7. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July.
    8. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
    9. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    10. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
    11. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
    12. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    13. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    14. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
    15. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    16. Watson Joel, 1994. "Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 260-285, September.
    17. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 1999. "A Behavioral Model of Bargaining with Endogenous Types," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s15, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    18. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    19. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 378-393, November.
    20. D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998. "Bargaining and Reputation," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    21. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1987. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(3), pages 345-364.
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