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Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Listed author(s):
  • Sorin, Sylvain

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(99)90722-4
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 29 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (October)
Pages: 274-308

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:29:y:1999:i:1-2:p:274-308
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/184 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Schmidt, K.M., 1992. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests," Working papers 92-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  4. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1992. "Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions," Discussion Papers 983, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
  6. SORIN, Sylvain, 1988. "Repeated games with complete information," CORE Discussion Papers 1988022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
  8. Forges, Francoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero-sum," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 155-177 Elsevier.
  9. Cripps, Martin W & Thomas, Jonathan P, 1995. "Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games without Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1401-1419, November.
  10. E. Kalai & E. Lehrer, 2010. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 529, David K. Levine.
  11. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.
  12. Aoyagi, Masaki, 1996. "Reputation and Dynamic Stackelberg Leadership in Infinitely Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 378-393, November.
  13. Cripps, Martin W. & Schmidt, Klaus M. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1996. "Reputation in Perturbed Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 387-410, May.
  14. Cripps, Martin W. & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1997. "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-158, February.
  15. Marco Celentani & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1992. "Reputation in Dynamic Games," Discussion Papers 1009, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
  17. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  18. Frank Hahn, 2010. "Exercises in Conjectural Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 526, David K. Levine.
  19. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
  20. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
  21. Watson Joel, 1994. "Cooperation in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 260-285, September.
  22. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
  23. Watson, Joel, 1996. "Reputation in Repeated Games with No Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 82-109, July.
  24. Lehrer, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Rann, 1997. "Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 116-134, January.
  25. Shalev Jonathan, 1994. "Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Known-Own Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 246-259, September.
  26. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
  27. Marco Celentani, 1996. "Reputation with observed actions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 407-419.
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