IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v7y1996i3p407-419.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reputation with observed actions (*)

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Celentani

    (Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, E-28903 Getafe , SPAIN)

Abstract

A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous or sequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for the Stackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Celentani, 1996. "Reputation with observed actions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(3), pages 407-419.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:407-419
    Note: Received: August 24, 1994; revised version January 13, 1995
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
    3. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    4. Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:7:y:1996:i:3:p:407-419. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.