Reputation with observed actions (*)
A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous or sequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for the Stackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.
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Volume (Year): 7 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: August 24, 1994; revised version January 13, 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|