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Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum


  • FORGES, Françoise


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  • FORGES, Françoise, 1992. "Repeated games of incomplete information: Non-zero sum," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1012, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1012 Note: In : Handbook of Game Theory, Vol.1, edited by R. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 155-177, 1992

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Tulkens, Henry, 1978. "Dynamic processes for public goods : An institution-oriented survey," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 163-201, April.
    2. John Roberts, 1979. "Incentives in Planning Procedures for the Provision of Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(2), pages 283-292.
    3. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., 1991. "Strategically Stable Cost Sharing in an Economic- Ecological Negotiation Process," CORE Discussion Papers 1991035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Chander, P., 1987. "Cost-sharing local games in dynamic processes for public goods," CORE Discussion Papers 1987027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Kaitala, Veijo & Pohjola, Matti, 1992. "Acid Rain and International Environmental Aid: A Case Study of Transboundary Air Pollution Between Finland, Russia and Estonia," Discussion Papers 400, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    6. Mueller, Dennis C, 1976. "Public Choice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 395-433, June.
    7. Chander, Parkash & Parikh, Ashok, 1990. " Theory and Practice of Decentralized Planning Procedures," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 19-58.
    8. Tulkens, Henry & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1975. "Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the `polluters pay' principle," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 245-269, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johannes Hörner & Stefano Lovo, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 453-487, March.
    2. Robert J. Aumann, 2007. "War and Peace," Chapters,in: Augustin Cournot: Modelling Economics, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Gossner, Olivier & Vieille, Nicolas, 2003. "Strategic learning in games with symmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 25-47, January.
    4. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
    5. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998. "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 292-310, November.
    6. Forges, Françoise & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Long persuasion games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 1-35, November.
    7. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    8. Martin W. Cripps & Jonathan P. Thomas, 2003. "Some Asymptotic Results in Discounted Repeated Games of One-Sided Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(3), pages 433-462, August.
    9. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2003. "Long Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1619-1660, November.
      • Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart, 2002. "Long Cheap Talk," Discussion Paper Series dp284, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, revised Nov 2002.
    10. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997. "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 159-175, February.
    11. Benito Arruñada & Xosé H. Vázquez, 2009. "Behavioral assumptions and management ability," Economics Working Papers 1157, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2010.
    12. Jimenez, Edward & Moya, Douglas, 2005. "Econophysics: from Game Theory and Information Theory to Quantum Mechanics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 348(C), pages 505-543.
    13. Pavlo Prokopovych & Lones Smith, 2004. "Subgame Perfect Correlated Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 287, Econometric Society.
    14. Christian Lukas & Jens Robert Schöndube, 2008. "Trust and Adaptive Learning in Implicit Contracts," FEMM Working Papers 08017, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    15. Ma, Jinpeng, 1995. "An infinitely repeated rental model with incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 261-266, September.
    16. Sorin, Sylvain, 1999. "Merging, Reputation, and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 274-308, October.
    17. Forges, Françoise, 2013. "A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 64-71.
    18. Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2010. "Communication in repeated monetary policy games," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 228-243, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics


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