Belief-free Equilibria in games with incomplete information
In this paper, the authors define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players’ continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. They characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff.
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