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Incomplete Information


  • Aumann, Robert J.
  • Heifetz, Aviad


In interactive contexts such as games and economies, it is important to take account not only of what the players believe about substantive matters (such as payoffs), but also of what they believe about the beliefs of other players. Two different but equivalent ways of dealing with this matter, the semantic and the syntactic, are set forth. Canonical and universal semantic systems are then defined and constructed, and the concepts of common knowledge and common priors formulated and characterized. The last two sections discuss relations with Bayesian games of incomplete information and their applications, and with interactive epistemology -- the theory of multi-agent knowledge and belief as formulated in mathematical logic.
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  • Aumann, Robert J. & Heifetz, Aviad, 2001. "Incomplete Information," Working Papers 1124, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1124

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon & Klibanoff, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2000. "Maxmin Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 35-65, May.
    2. Casadesus-Masanell, Ramon & Klibanoff, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2000. "Maxmin expected utility through statewise combinations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 49-54, January.
    3. Hong Chew Soo & Karni Edi, 1994. "Choquet Expected Utility with a Finite State Space: Commutativity and Act-Independence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 469-479, April.
    4. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Peter Klibanoff & Emre Ozdenoren, 1998. "Maximum Expected Utility over Savage Acts with a Set of Priors," Discussion Papers 1218, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Truman F. Bewley, 1986. "Knightian Decision Theory: Part 1," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 807, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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