Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence
We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Economic Theory (September 2011), 146(5): 1770-1795|
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2007.
"Belief Free Incomplete Information Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1629, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Chassang, Sylvain, 2011. "Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
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