Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games
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- Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1986. "Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 791, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1990.
"Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 194-206, June.
- D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.