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Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game

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  • Marialaura Pesce
  • Nicholas C Yannelis

Abstract

We introduce the notions of ex-ante and interim minimax point for an asymmetric information game and prove the existence of such points. Our new results include as a special case the theorem in (Aliprantis et al., 2009).
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Suggested Citation

  • Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas C Yannelis, 2009. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0922, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  • Handle: RePEc:man:sespap:0922
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    File URL: http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/schools/soss/economics/discussionpapers/EDP-0922.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.
    2. Aliprantis, C.D. & Chakrabarti, S.K. & Topolyan, I., 2009. "A proof of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 261-263, December.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 1(2), pages 183-197, April.
    5. Thomas, J. P., 1995. "Subgame-perfect attainment of minimax punishments in discounted two-person games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 1-4, January.
    6. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.

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