A proof of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic game
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- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008.
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Cited by:
- Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010.
"Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.
- Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas C Yannelis, 2009. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0922, Economics, The University of Manchester.
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Keywords
Strategic game Minimax point Attainable minimax points;Statistics
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