A proof of the existence of the minimax point of a strategic game
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References listed on IDEAS
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, July.
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796, June.
- Philippe Robert-Demontrond & R. Ringoot, 2004. "Introduction," Post-Print halshs-00081823, HAL.
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- Pesce, Marialaura & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2010.
"Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game,"
Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 4-6, July.
- Marialaura Pesce & Nicholas C Yannelis, 2009. "Existence of an interim and ex-ante minimax point for an asymmetric information game," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0922, Economics, The University of Manchester.
More about this item
KeywordsStrategic game Minimax point Attainable minimax points;
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