Repeated Games with Asynchronous Moves
This paper studies a class of dynamic games, called repeated games with asynchronous moves, where not all players may revise their actions in every period. With state-dependent backwards induction, we introduce the concept of effective minimax in repeated games with asynchronous moves. A player's effective minimax value crucially depends on the asynchronous move structure in the repeated game, but not on the player's minimax or effective minimax value in the stage game. Any player's equilibrium payoffs are bounded below by his effective minimax value. We establish a folk theorem: when players are sufficiently patient, any feasible payoff vector where every player receives more than his effective minimax value can be approximated by a perfect equilibrium in the repeated game with asynchronous moves. This folk theorem integrates Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) folk theorem for standard repeated games, Lagunoff and Matsui's (1997) anti-folk theorem for repeated pure coordination game with asynchronous moves, and Wen's (2002) folk theorem for repeated sequential games.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsu, .
"Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
23a1aa461811b8f48b0334f6e, Penn Economics Department.
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1467-1478, November.
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsu, . ""Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games''," CARESS Working Papres 96-10, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9707002, EconWPA.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Sorin Sylvain, 1995. "A Note on Repeated Extensive Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 116-123, April.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
- Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
- Quan Wen, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512.
- Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 191-200, January.
- Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-48, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.