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On asynchronously repeated games

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  • Takahashi, Satoru
  • Wen, Quan

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  • Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:79:y:2003:i:2:p:239-245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kiho Yoon, 2004. "The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 431-442, August.
    2. Quan Wen, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512.
    3. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(6), pages 1467-1478, November.
    4. Wen, Quan, 1994. "The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 949-954, July.
    5. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
    7. Rubinstein Ariel & Wolinsky Asher, 1995. "Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 110-115, April.
    8. Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 191-200, January.
    9. Sorin Sylvain, 1995. "A Note on Repeated Extensive Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 116-123, April.
    10. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-1364, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
    2. Libich, Jan, 2009. "A Note On The Anchoring Effect Of Explicit Inflation Targets," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(5), pages 685-697, November.
    3. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
    4. Libich Jan, 2011. "Inflation Nutters? Modelling the Flexibility of Inflation Targeting," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-36, June.

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