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Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

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  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Finance and Control, EMLYON Business School)

  • ,

    (Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University)

  • ,

    (Finance Department, HEC Paris and GREGHEC)

  • ,

    (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

Abstract

We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player \textquotedblleft common interest" games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In \textquotedblleft opposing interest" games, which are $2\times 2$ games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.

Suggested Citation

  • , & , & , & ,, 2014. "Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1202
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    Cited by:

    1. Dutta, Rohan & Ishii, Ryosuke, 2016. "Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 699-727.
    2. Ala Avoyan & João Ramos, 2023. "A Road to Efficiency through Communication and Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(9), pages 2355-2381, September.
    3. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Zero-sum revision games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 504-522.
    4. Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
    5. Roy, Nilanjan, 2017. "Action revision, information and collusion in an experimental duopoly market," MPRA Paper 77033, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Jérôme Mathis & Marcello Puca & Simone M. Sepe, 2021. "Deliberative Institutions and Optimality," CSEF Working Papers 614, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 09 Jun 2021.
    7. Sofia Moroni, 2018. "Games with Private Timing," Working Paper 6400, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    8. Roy, Nilanjan, 2023. "Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    9. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    10. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    11. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2019. "Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    12. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
    13. Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    14. Jin, Ye & Zhou, Zhen & Brandenburger, Adam, 2023. "Coordination via delay: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 23-49.
    15. Yuichiro Kamada & Michihiro Kandori, 2020. "Revision Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1630, July.
    16. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 2018. "A Dynamic Model of Repositioning," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(2), pages 279-293, March.
    17. Mahendra Piraveenan, 2019. "Applications of Game Theory in Project Management: A Structured Review and Analysis," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 7(9), pages 1-31, September.
    18. Rohan Dutta & Ryosuke Ishii, 2013. "Coordinating by Not Committing : Efficiency as the Unique Outcome," Cahiers de recherche 10-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    19. Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Revision games; pre-opening; finite horizon; equilibrium selection; asynchronous moves;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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