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Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

  • Calcagno, Riccardo

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Finance and Control, EMLYON Business School)

  • Sugaya, Takuo

    ()

    (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

  • Kamada, Yuichiro

    ()

    (Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University)

  • Lovo, Stefano

    ()

    (Finance Department, HEC Paris and GREGHEC)

Registered author(s):

    We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player \textquotedblleft common interest" games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In \textquotedblleft opposing interest" games, which are $2\times 2$ games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.

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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20140409/10816/331
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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 2 (May)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1202
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econtheory.org

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    1. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    2. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116.
    3. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1993. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Other publications TiSEM 49a54f00-dcec-4fc1-9488-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Biais, Bruno & Bisière, Christophe & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market," IDEI Working Papers 543, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    5. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    6. Wen, Quan, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512, April.
    7. Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 191-200, January.
    8. repec:bla:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:99-116 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
    10. Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
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