IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper

Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria

  • Oyama, Daisuke
  • Tercieux, Olivier

For any given set-valued solution concept, it is possible to consider iterative elimination of actions outside the solution set. This paper applies such a procedure to define the concept of iterated monotone potential maximizer (iterated MP-maximizer). It is shown that under some monotonicity conditions, an iterated MP-maximizer is robust to incomplete information (Kajii and Morris, Econometrica 65 (1997)) and absorbing and globally accessible under perfect foresight dynamics for a small friction (Matsui and Matsuyama, Journal of Economic Theory 65 (1995)). Several simple sufficient conditions under which a game has an iterated MP-maximizer are also provided.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1599/1/MPRA_paper_1599.pdf
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14320/1/MPRA_paper_14320.pdf
File Function: revised version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 1599.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 31 Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1599
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany

Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2459
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-992459
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," MPRA Paper 6721, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Oyama, Daisuke, 2006. "Agglomeration under Forward-Looking Expectations: Potentials and Global Stability," MPRA Paper 15239, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  4. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September.
  5. Michihiro, Kandori & Rob, Rafael, 1998. "Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-60, January.
  6. Akihiko Matsui & Daisuke Oyama, 2002. "Rationalizable Foresight Dynamics: Evolution and Rationalizability," Vienna Economics Papers 0302, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  7. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  8. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 878, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. smorris & Takashi Ui, 2004. "Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 45, Econometric Society.
  10. Carlsson, H. & van Damme, E.E.C., 1990. "Global games and equilibrium selection," Discussion Paper 1990-52, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Okada, Daijiro & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Log-linear dynamics and local potential," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1140-1164.
  12. Hofbauer, Josef & Sorger, Gerhard, 1999. "Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 1-23, March.
  13. Olivier Tercieux, 2006. "p-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information," Post-Print halshs-00754138, HAL.
  14. Morris, S & Song Shin, H, 1996. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," Economics Papers 126, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  15. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-80, September.
  16. Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori, 1995. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 415-434, April.
  17. Slade, Margaret E, 1994. "What Does an Oligopoly Maximize?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 45-61, March.
  18. M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
  19. S. Morris & R. Rob & H. Shin, 2010. "p-dominance and Belief Potential," Levine's Working Paper Archive 505, David K. Levine.
  20. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2008. "The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 551-559, 04-05.
  22. Oyama, Daisuke, 2002. "p-Dominance and Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 288-310, December.
  23. Kojima, Fuhito, 2006. "Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 255-273, May.
  24. Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 367-382, January.
  25. Atsushi Kajii & Stephen Morris, . "The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information," Penn CARESS Working Papers ed504c985fc375cbe719b3f60, Penn Economics Department.
  26. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  27. Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, 2005. "Demand-Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(3), pages 1293-1327, 06.
  28. Tercieux, Olivier, 2006. "p-Best response set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 45-70, November.
  29. Kim, Youngse, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection inn-Person Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 203-227, August.
  30. Matsuyama, Kiminori, 1992. "The market size, entrepreneurship, and the big push," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 347-364, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:1599. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.