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Monotone and local potential maximizers in symmetric 3x3 supermodular games

  • Daisuke Oyama

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University)

  • Satoru Takahashi

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Princeton University)

Generalized notions of potential maximizer, monotone potential maximizer (MP-maximizer) and local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer), are studied. It is known that 2x2 coordination games generically have a potential maximizer, while symmetric 4x4 supermodular games may have no MP- or LP-maximizer. This note considers the case inbetween, namely the class of (generic) symmetric 3x3 supermodular coordination games. This class of games are shown to always have a unique MP-maximizer, and its complete characterization is given. A nondegenerate example demonstrates that own-action quasiconcave supermodular games may have more than one LP-maximizers.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I3-P61.pdf
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Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 29 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 2123-2135

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00406
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  1. David M. Frankel & Stephen Morris & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1490, Econometric Society.
  2. Hofbauer, Josef & Sorger, Gerhard, 1999. "Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 1-23, March.
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  4. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2005. "Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 45-78, September.
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  6. Ui, Takashi, 2001. "Robust Equilibria of Potential Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1373-80, September.
  7. Daijiro Okada & Olivier Tercieux, 2008. "Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential," Economics Working Papers 0085, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  8. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2004. "Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria," MPRA Paper 1599, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  10. L. Blume, 2010. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 488, David K. Levine.
  11. Akihiko Matsui & Kiminori Matsuyama, 1990. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Discussion Papers 970, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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