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Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria

  • NORA, Vladyslav

    ()

    (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • UNO, Hiroshi

    ()

    (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka Prefecture University, Japan)

This paper introduces games with a saddle function. A saddle function is a real valued function on the set of action profiles such that, for one player, minimizing the function implies choosing her best-response, and, for the other players, maximizing it implies choosing their best-responses. We provide a new sufficient condition for robustness to incomplete information of sets of equilibria in a sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, Econometrica), Morris and Ui (2005, J. of Econ. Theory) for games with a saddle function. Our result unifies and generalizes sufficient conditions for zero-sum and best-response potential games.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2012050.

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Date of creation: 10 Dec 2012
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2012050
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