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Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Gossner

    () (Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques, UMR CNRS-EHESS-ENPC-ENS 8545, 48 Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France and MEDS, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2001)

  • Tristan Tomala

    () (CEREMADE, UMR CNRS 7534, Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris, Cedex 16, France)

Abstract

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal tradeoff for the team between optimization of stage payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 32(2), pages 413-424, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormoor:v:32:y:2007:i:2:p:413-424
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1060.0248
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    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
    3. Ron Peretz, 2013. "Correlation through bounded recall strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 867-890, November.
    4. Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
    5. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    6. Bavly, Gilad & Neyman, Abraham, 2014. "Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 71-89.
    7. repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0569-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    9. Ron Peretz, 2011. "Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies," Discussion Paper Series dp579, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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