Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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- Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Post-Print hal-00487954, HAL.
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- Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016.
"Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
- Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
- Ron Peretz, 2013. "Correlation through bounded recall strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 867-890, November.
- Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010.
"When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
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- Olivier Gossner & Johannes Hörner, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Post-Print halshs-00754488, HAL.
- Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
- Bavly, Gilad & Neyman, Abraham, 2014.
"Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 71-89.
- Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2014. "Online Concealed Correlation and Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Series dp659, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- repec:spr:jogath:v:46:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0569-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
- Ron Peretz, 2011. "Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies," Discussion Paper Series dp579, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
More about this item
Keywordsstochastic process; min--max values; signals; entropy; repeated games; secret correlation;
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