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Nested Potential Games


  • Hiroshi Uno

    () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)


This paper proposes a new class of potential games, the nested potential games, which generalize the potential games defined in Monderer and Shapley (1996), as well as the pseudo-potential games defined in Dubey et al. (2006). We show that each maximizer of a nested potential is a Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Uno, 2007. "Nested Potential Games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(19), pages 1-8.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07c70005

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July.
    2. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(2), June.
    3. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2005. "Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 45-78, September.
    4. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
    5. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2006. "Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 77-94, January.
    6. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
    7. Hofbauer, Josef & Sorger, Gerhard, 1999. "Perfect Foresight and Equilibrium Selection in Symmetric Potential Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 1-23, March.
    8. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nora, Vladyslav & Uno, Hiroshi, 2014. "Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 866-877.
    2. Candogan, Ozan & Ozdaglar, Asuman & Parrilo, Pablo A., 2013. "Dynamics in near-potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 66-90.
    3. Ewerhart, Christian, 2017. "The lottery contest is a best-response potential game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 168-171.
    4. Park, Jaeok, 2015. "Potential games with incomplete preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 58-66.

    More about this item


    potential games;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory


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