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Dynamics in near-potential games

  • Candogan, Ozan
  • Ozdaglar, Asuman
  • Parrilo, Pablo A.
Registered author(s):

    We consider discrete-time learning dynamics in finite strategic form games, and show that games that are close to a potential game inherit many of the dynamical properties of potential games. We first study the evolution of the sequence of pure strategy profiles under better/best response dynamics. We show that this sequence converges to a (pure) approximate equilibrium set whose size is a function of the “distance” to a given nearby potential game. We then focus on logit response dynamics, and provide a characterization of the limiting outcome in terms of the distance of the game to a given potential game and the corresponding potential function. Finally, we turn attention to fictitious play, and establish that in near-potential games the sequence of empirical frequencies of player actions converges to a neighborhood of (mixed) equilibria, where the size of the neighborhood increases according to the distance to the set of potential games.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825613000948
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

    Volume (Year): 82 (2013)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 66-90

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:66-90
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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