IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

Listed author(s):
  • Hofbauer,J.
  • Sandholm,W.H.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

We consider four models of evolution and learning in games which rely on perturbations of payoffs, including stochastic fictitious play. In all cases, we establish global stability results for zerosum games, games with an interior ESS, potential games, and supermodular games.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://mailbox.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0205.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 5.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2001
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20015
Contact details of provider: Postal:
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON, SOCIAL SYSTEMS RESEARCH INSTITUTE(S.S.R.I.), MADISON WISCONSIN 53706 U.S.A.

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  2. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
  3. CHEN, Hsiao-Ch. & FRIEDMAN, J.W. & THISSE, Jacques-Francois, 1996. "Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach," CORE Discussion Papers 1996044, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1981. "Qualitative Response Models: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 1483-1536, December.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
  6. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9729r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  8. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  9. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  10. J. Robinson, 1969. "An Iterative Method of Solving a Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 422, David K. Levine.
  11. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  12. R. Pemantle, 2010. "Non-convergence to unstable points in urn models and stochastic approximations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 483, David K. Levine.
  13. Foster, Dean P. & Young, H. Peyton, 1998. "On the Nonconvergence of Fictitious Play in Coordination Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 79-96, October.
  14. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
  15. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
  16. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  17. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  18. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
  19. Lawrence Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Game Theory and Information 9607001, EconWPA.
  20. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment to Equilibrium Under Noisy Directional Learning," Virginia Economics Online Papers 327, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
  21. Donald A. Walker (ed.), 2000. "Equilibrium," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1585.
  22. repec:hhs:iuiwop:534 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Antonella Ianni, "undated". ""Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games''," CARESS Working Papres 98-05, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  24. Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Post-Print hal-00753235, HAL.
  25. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  26. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  27. Lawrence E. Blume, 1994. "How Noise Matters," Game Theory and Information 9407002, EconWPA, revised 27 Jul 1994.
  28. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
  29. Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  30. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  31. Ed Hopkins, 1997. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," ESE Discussion Papers 3, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ailsenne Sumwalt)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.