Population games are stochastic processes which explicitly model Nash's (1950) mass action interpretation of Nash equilibrium. The mass action interpretation envisions a population of players for each position in the game, and that players are randomly matched for play. The hope is that the long-run behavior of the processes can be described by a Nash equilibrium. Recent analyses of these population processes finds that sometimes this hope is realized, and sometimes not. Moreover, when it is realized, some Nash equilibria are favored over others. This paper surveys the new literature on poulation games, and discusses the application of population game techniques to strategic situations other than $N$-player random-matching population games.
|Date of creation:||06 Jul 1996|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||Type of Document - Postscript File; prepared on a Sun, TeX 3.1415; to print on Postscript; pages: 33 + ii; figures: included.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://184.108.40.206|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9607001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.