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Population Games

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Abstract

In most economists' view, aggregate economic activity results from the interactions of many small economic agents pursuing diverse interests. To some, this statement is a normative proposition. It immediately brings to mind Adam Smith's famous metaphor of the invisible hand, an expression of the normative superiority of markets as a resource allocation device. But even among those economists who hold a more cautious view of the superiority of markets, methodological individualism, the emphasis on the primacy of individual agents, has had an enormous impact on research into aggregate economic phenomena. For instance, it has led to the wholesale scrapping of those parts of macroeconomics lacking adqeuate "microfoundations," and to the acceptance of the "new classical macroeconomics," search theories of macroeconomic activity and other micro-based models. Nowadays a model of aggregate economic activity is only acceptable if it can be derived by aggregation from acceptable models of the behavior of individual agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Larry E. Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Working Papers 96-04-022, Santa Fe Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:wop:safiwp:96-04-022
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    Cited by:

    1. Kandori, Michihiro & Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 2008. "Decentralized trade, random utility and the evolution of social welfare," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 328-338, May.
    2. Philippe Solal & Jacques Durieu, 2005. "Interaction on Hypergraphs," Post-Print hal-00375568, HAL.
    3. Mäs, Michael & Nax, Heinrich H., 2016. "A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 195-208.
    4. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2009. "Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics," Discussion Papers 21, Kyiv School of Economics.
    5. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
    6. Alós-Ferrer, Carlos & Netzer, Nick, 2010. "The logit-response dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 413-427, March.
    7. Sylvain Barde, 2009. "The Google thought experiment: rationality, information and equilibrium in an exchange economy," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) hal-01069373, HAL.
    8. Sandholm, William H., 2007. "Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 367-382, January.
    9. Durlauf, S.N., 1997. "Rational Choice and the Study of Science," Working papers 9709r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    10. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2005. "Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 45-78, September.
    11. Kenneth J. Arrow, 1998. "What Has Economics to Say about Racial Discrimination?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(2), pages 91-100, Spring.
    12. Steven N. Durlauf, 1996. "Statistical Mechanics Approaches to Socioeconomic Behavior," Working Papers 96-08-069, Santa Fe Institute.
    13. Dave Colander, 2008. "Complexity, Pedagogy and the Economics of Muddling Through," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0805, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
    14. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001. "Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    15. Roland Pongou & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "A Dynamic Theory of Fidelity Networks with an Application to the Spread of HIV / AIDS," Working Papers wp2009_0909, CEMFI.
    16. Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000. "Evolution with diverse preferences," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    17. Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2011. "Nonspecific Networking," Games, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, February.
    18. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
    19. Rambha, Tarun & Boyles, Stephen D., 2016. "Dynamic pricing in discrete time stochastic day-to-day route choice models," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 92(PA), pages 104-118.
    20. Pancs, Romans & Vriend, Nicolaas J., 2007. "Schelling's spatial proximity model of segregation revisited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 1-24, February.
    21. Jean Louis Dessalles & Denis Phan, 2005. "Emergence in multi-agent systems:Cognitive hierarchy, detection, and complexity reduction," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 257, Society for Computational Economics.
    22. Okada, Daijiro & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Log-linear dynamics and local potential," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1140-1164.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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