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Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs

  • Hofbauer,J.
  • Sandholm,W.H.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

No abstract is available for this item.

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Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 20.

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Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:200320

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Sandholm, William H., 2003. "Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 343-378, August.
  2. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  3. Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," ESE Discussion Papers 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  4. Lawrence Blume, 1996. "Population Games," Game Theory and Information 9607001, EconWPA.
  5. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521570176.
  6. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
  7. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
  8. Kaniovski Yuri M. & Young H. Peyton, 1995. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 330-363, November.
  9. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  10. Blume Lawrence E., 1993. "The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 387-424, July.
  11. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
  12. Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
  13. repec:bla:restud:v:66:y:1999:i:2:p:363-93 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
  15. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  16. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9729r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  17. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
  18. D. Foster & P. Young, 2010. "Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 493, David K. Levine.
  19. repec:oup:restud:v:72:y:2005:i:3:p:885-915 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967.
  21. Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, 05.
  22. Y. Kanivokski & P. Young, 2010. "Learning Dynamics in Games with Stochastic Perturbations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 476, David K. Levine.
  23. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 390, David K. Levine.
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