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Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice

  • Ponti, Giovanni

This paper surveys some recent developments in the literature which studies continuous-timeevolutionary dynamics in the context of economic modeling.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WWP-45BCRGD-4/2/4e04ac3e449229c1b46225bfcee390c7
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 54 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 187-214

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:54:y:2000:i:2:p:187-214
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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  1. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
  2. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  3. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 558-573, November.
  4. Cressman, R., 1996. "Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 234-248, January.
  5. K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
  6. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
  7. L. Samuelson & J. Zhang, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 453, David K. Levine.
  8. Borgers, Tilman & Sarin, Rajiv, 1997. "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 1-14, November.
  9. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Levine's Working Paper Archive 390, David K. Levine.
  10. Antonio Cabrales, 1993. "Stochastic replicator dynamics," Economics Working Papers 54, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  11. Cass, David & Shell, Karl, 1983. "Do Sunspots Matter?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(2), pages 193-227, April.
  12. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
  13. Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199527, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  14. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  15. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  16. LiCalzi Marco, 1995. "Fictitious Play by Cases," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 64-89, October.
  17. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  18. Cross, John G, 1973. "A Stochastic Learning Model of Economic Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(2), pages 239-66, May.
  19. Selten,Reinhard, . "Evolution,learning and economic behaviour," Discussion Paper Serie B 132, University of Bonn, Germany.
  20. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
  21. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1972. "Expectations and the neutrality of money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 103-124, April.
  22. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  23. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 363-93, April.
  24. R. Cressman, K.H. Schlag, 1995. "The Dynamic (In)Stability of Backwards Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 347, University of Bonn, Germany.
  25. Borgers, Tilman, 1996. "On the Relevance of Learning and Evolution to Economic Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1374-85, September.
  26. Cressman, R., 1997. "Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 1-19, August.
  27. R. Boylan, 2010. "Continuous Approximation of Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 372, David K. Levine.
  28. P. Young, 1999. "The Evolution of Conventions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 485, David K. Levine.
  29. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1997. "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 235-265, June.
  30. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
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