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Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game


  • Cressman, R.


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  • Cressman, R., 1996. "Evolutionary Stability in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner 's Dilemma Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 234-248, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:68:y:1996:i:1:p:234-248

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robert M. Solow, 1956. "A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 65-94.
    2. Benhabib, J. & Perli, R., 1993. "Uniqueness and Indeterminacy: Transitional Dynamics in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Working Papers 93-13, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    3. Brock, William A. & Gale, David, 1969. "Optimal growth under factor augmenting progress," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 229-243, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Cycles of Learning in the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 115-141, January.
    2. repec:fth:calaec:16-97 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Lindgren, Kristian & Verendel, Vilhelm, 2013. "Evolutionary Exploration of the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma--The Effect of Out-of-Equilibrium Play," MPRA Paper 43662, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
    5. Balkenborg, Dieter & Schlag, Karl H., 2007. "On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 295-315, March.
    6. Ponti, Giovanni, 2000. "Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 187-214, June.
    7. Bernergård, Axel & Mohlin, Erik, 2017. "Evolutionary Selection against Iteratively Weakly Dominated Strategies," Working Papers 2017:18, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    8. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier.
    9. repec:cdl:ucsbec:16-97 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs, 2016. "In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 161-189.

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