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Correlation, Learning and the Robustness of Cooperation

  • Nicola Dimitri

    (Universita di Siena)

Registered author(s):

    In the stage game Prisoner's Dilemna one line of research which is pursued to justify the cooperative outcome is based upton some idea of correlation. This paper aims at testing whether correlation could support a cooperative behavior in the long run, by embedding the infinitely repeataed game within a simple evolutionary framework. In particular, the main theorem states that just two born cooperative agents might remain cooperative forever with strictly positive probability. This robustness result appears to be particularly strong since the model allows cooperative agents to switch strategy and start defecting from a certain time onward, but not vice versa. (Copyright: Elsevier)

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    Article provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.

    Volume (Year): 3 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 2 (April)
    Pages: 311-329

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    Handle: RePEc:red:issued:v:3:y:2000:i:2:p:311-329
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