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Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation

Listed author(s):
  • David K Levine
  • Wolfgang Pesendorfer

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/evoshort15.pdf
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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 7630.

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Date of creation: 25 Mar 2005
Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:7630
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

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  1. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Michihiro, Kandori & Rob, Rafael, 1998. "Bandwagon Effects and Long Run Technology Choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 30-60, January.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
  4. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August.
  5. Theodore C. Bergstrom, 2002. "Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 67-88, Spring.
  6. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Game Played by Finite Automata," Papers 9131, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  7. J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
  8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, "undated". "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
  10. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  11. Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996. "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers 9612, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  12. Daniel Friedman, 2010. "On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 53, David K. Levine.
  13. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
  14. Eric Van Damme & Jorgen W Weibull, 1999. "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2113, David K. Levine.
  15. Kim, Y.G. & Sobel, J., 1993. "An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 93-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  16. David K. Levine, 1998. "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(3), pages 593-622, July.
  17. Philip Johnson & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game," Levine's Working Paper Archive 162, David K. Levine.
  18. Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996.
  19. Alan Kirman, 1993. "Ants, Rationality, and Recruitment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 137-156.
  20. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
  21. David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2000. "Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2122, David K. Levine.
  22. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, September.
  23. repec:hhs:iuiwop:501 is not listed on IDEAS
  24. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  25. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
  26. Robson, A.J., 1989. "Efficiency In Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash And Secret Handshake," Papers 89-22, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  27. Frank, Robert H, 1987. "If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 593-604, September.
  28. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 370, David K. Levine.
  29. E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg, 1984. "The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information," Working papers 310, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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