IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cla/levarc/391.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination

Author

Listed:
  • Glen Ellison

Abstract

This paper discusses the dynamic implications of learning in a large population coordination game, focusing on the structure of the matching process that describes how players meet. As in M. Kandori, G. Mailath, and R. Rob (1992), experimentation and myopia create 'evolutionary' forces that lead players to coordinate on the risk dominant equilibrium. To describe play with finite time horizons, it is necessary to consider the rates at which the dynamic systems converge. In large populations with uniform matching, play is determined largely by historical factors. When players interact with small sets of neighbors, evolutionary forces may determine the outcome. Copyright 1993 by The Econometric Society.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Glen Ellison, 2010. "Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination," Levine's Working Paper Archive 391, David K. Levine.
  • Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:391
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4391.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peyton Young, H. & Foster, Dean, 1991. "Cooperation in the long-run," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 145-156, February.
    2. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:391. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine). General contact details of provider: http://www.dklevine.com/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.