On economic applications of evolutionary game theory
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- Daniel Friedman, 2010. "On Economic Applications of Evolutionary Game Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 53, David K. Levine.
References listed on IDEAS
- Bergin, James & Lipman, Barton L, 1996.
"Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations,"
Econometric Society, vol. 64(4), pages 943-956, July.
- BERGIN, James & LIPMAN, Bart, 1994. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," CORE Discussion Papers 1994055, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- J Bergin & B L Lipman, 1997. "Evolution with state-dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 771, David K. Levine.
- James Bergin & B. L. Lipman, 1994. "Evolution with state-dependent mutations," Working Papers 199411, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
- Balkenborg, D. & Schlag, K.H., 1997. "On the interpretation of evolutionarily stable sets," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9710, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April.
More about this item
KeywordsEvolutionary games ; Adjustment dynamics ; ESS ; Evolutionary equilibrium;
- B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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