IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Adaptive social learning

  • Christoph March

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)

This paper investigates the learning foundations of economic models of social learning. We pursue the prevalent idea in economics that rational play is the outcome of a dynamic process of adaptation. Our learning approach offers us the possibility to clarify when and why the prevalent rational (equilibrium) view of social learning is likely to capture observed regularities in the field. In particular it enables us to address the issue of individual and interactive knowledge. We argue that knowledge about the private belief distribution is unlikely to be shared in most social learning contexts. Absent this mutual knowledge, we show that the long-run outcome of the adaptive process favors non-Bayesian rational play.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00572528v2/document
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE Working Papers with number halshs-00572528.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00572528
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00572528v2
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Werlang, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa & Chin-Chiu Tan, Tommy, 1987. "The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 111, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  2. Beggs Alan, 2009. "Learning in Bayesian Games with Binary Actions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-30, September.
  3. Jakub Steiner, 2007. "Contagion through Learning," ESE Discussion Papers 151, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  4. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
  5. Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, June.
  7. Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Learning and Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 4382413, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Georg Weizsacker, 2008. "Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4945, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  9. Kenneth Hendricks & Dan Kovenock, 1989. "Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, and Efficiency: The Case of Oil Exploration," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 164-182, Summer.
  10. Philippe Jehiel, 2005. "Analogy-based Expectation Equilibrium," Post-Print halshs-00754070, HAL.
  11. Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2010. "A Theory of Deception," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 1-20, February.
  13. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2010. "A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1193, David K. Levine.
  14. Sergiu Hart, 2004. "Adaptive Heuristics," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000471, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
  16. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2220-2259.
  17. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1991. "Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 82-100, February.
  18. Christoph March & Anthony Ziegelmeyer, 2009. "Behavioral Social Learning," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-105, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  19. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Information feedback in first price auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 491-508.
  20. Lones Smith & Peter Sorensen, 2000. "Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 371-398, March.
  21. Nabil I. Al-Najjar, 2009. "Decision Makers as Statisticians: Diversity, Ambiguity, and Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(5), pages 1371-1401, 09.
  22. Swinkels, Jeroen M. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Information, evolution and utility," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(1), pages 119-142, March.
  23. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
  24. Ed Hopkins, 2001. "Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000226, David K. Levine.
  25. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  26. Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "Learning across games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 601-619.
  27. Gale, Douglas, 1996. "What have we learned from social learning?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 617-628, April.
  28. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2009. "The Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 249-284, November.
  29. Vives, Xavier, 1996. "Social learning and rational expectations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 589-601, April.
  30. Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
  31. Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehie, 2009. "Social Learning with Coarse Inference," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000292, David K. Levine.
  32. Anderson, Lisa R & Holt, Charles A, 1997. "Information Cascades in the Laboratory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 847-62, December.
  33. Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
  34. Xavier Vives, 1993. "How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 329-347.
  35. Jeheil Phillippe, 1995. "Limited Horizon Forecast in Repeated Alternate Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 497-519, December.
  36. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
  37. Aumann, Robert J., 1997. "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 2-14, October.
  38. Bernard Walliser, 1998. "A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 67-87.
  39. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1269-91, September.
  40. Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Weinstein, Jonathan, 2009. "Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(03), pages 357-369, November.
  41. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Frédéric Koessler & Juergen Bracht & Eyal Winter, 2010. "Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 121-145, June.
  42. Topi Miettinen, 2012. "Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 193-222, May.
  43. Antonio Guarino & Philippe Jehiel, 2013. "Social Learning with Coarse Inference," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00813047, HAL.
  44. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 1998. "Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 151-170, Summer.
  45. Walk, Harro, 2008. "A universal strong law of large numbers for conditional expectations via nearest neighbors," Journal of Multivariate Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 99(6), pages 1035-1050, July.
  46. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00572528. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.