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Manipulative Auction Design

Author

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  • Philippe Jehiel

    (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics, UCL - University College of London [London])

Abstract

This paper considers an auction design framework in which bidders get partial feedback about the distribution of bids submitted in earlier auctions: either bidders are asymmetric but past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way or several auction formats are being used and the distribution of bids, but not the associated formats, is disclosed. I employ the analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005) to model such situations. First-price auctions in which past bids are disclosed in an anonymous way generate more revenues than second-price auctions while achieving an efficient outcome in the asymmetric private values two-bidder case with independent distributions. Besides, by using several auction formats with coarse feedback, a designer can always extract more revenues than in Myerson's optimal auction, and yet less revenues than in the full information case whenever bidders enjoy ex post quitting rights and the assignment and payment rules are monotonic in bids. These results suggest an important role of feedback disclosure as a novel instrument in mechanism design.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Jehiel, 2011. "Manipulative Auction Design," Post-Print halshs-00754541, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754541
    DOI: 10.3982/TE687
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-pjse.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00754541
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jehiel, Philippe & Koessler, Frédéric, 2008. "Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 533-557, March.
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    3. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    4. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    5. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 413-438.
    6. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Ignacio Esponda, 2008. "Information feedback in first price auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 491-508.
    8. David Ettinger & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Towards a Theory of Deception," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000247, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
    10. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-392, June.
    11. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kalai, Ehud, 1997. "Social Learning in Recurring Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 102-134, October.
    12. Philippe Jehiel & Steffen Huck & Tom Rutter, 2007. "Learning Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations: a Multi-Game Experiment," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000120, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Grimm, Veronika & Mengel, Friederike, 2012. "An experiment on learning in a multiple games environment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2220-2259.
    2. François Maréchal & Pierre-Henri Morand, 2012. "The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 323-330, December.
    3. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
    4. repec:kap:regeco:v:53:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s11149-018-9358-x is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2015. "On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(2), pages 241-270, June.
    6. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    7. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2014. "Complex Questionnaires," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275824, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    8. Koutroumpis, Pantelis & Cave, Martin, 2018. "Auction design and auction outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 88371, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Virág, Gábor, 2016. "Auctions with resale: Reserve prices and revenues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 239-249.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction design; Analogy-based expectation equilibrium; Manipulation;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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