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Feedback Design in Strategic-Form Games with Ambiguity Averse Players

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  • Frédéric Koessler

    (HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, GREGHEC - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Marieke Pahlke

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

We use a notion of maxmin self-confirming equilibrium (MSCE) to study the optimal design of players' feedbacks about others' behavior in games with ambiguity averse players. Coarse feedbacks shape strategic uncertainty and can therefore modify players' equilibrium strategies in an advantageous way. We characterize MSCE and study the equilibrium implications of coarse feedbacks in various classes of games. We show how feedbacks should be optimally designed to improve contributions in generalized volunteer dilemmas and public good games with strategic substitutes, strategic complements, or more general production functions. We also study games with negative externalities and strategic substitutes such as Cournot oligopolies. In general, perfect and no feedbacks are suboptimal. Some results are extended to α-maxmin preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Frédéric Koessler & Marieke Pahlke, 2023. "Feedback Design in Strategic-Form Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," PSE Working Papers halshs-04039083, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04039083
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-04039083
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

    Self-confirming equilibrium; Ambiguity aversion; Information feedback; Strategic uncertainty; Public good games; Volunteer dilemma;
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