Analysis of Information Feedback and Selfconfirming Equilibrium
Recent research emphasizes the importance of information feedback in situations of recurrent decisions and strategic interaction, showing how it affects the uncertainty that underlies selfcon?rming equilibrium (e.g., Battigalli et al. [9, 2015], Fudenberg and Kamada [13, 2015]). Here, we discuss in detail several properties of this key feature of recurrent interaction and derive relationships. This allows us to elucidate our notion of Maxmin selfconfi?rming equilibrium, hereby agents are extremely ambiguity averse, and to compare it with the partially-speci?ed-probabilities (PSP) equilibrium of Lehrer [19, 2012]. Symmetric Maxmin selfcon?firming equilibrium in mixed strategies exists under either ?observable payoffs,?or ?separable feedback.?The latter assumption makes this equilibrium concept essentially equivalent to PSP-equilibrium. If observability of payoffs holds as well, then these equilibrium concepts collapse to mixed Nash equilibrium. Keywords: Selfconfi?rming equilibrium, conjectural equilibrium, information feedback, ambiguity aversion, partially speci?ed probabilities. JEL classification: C72, D80.
|Date of creation:||2012|
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- P Battigalli & S Cerreia-Vioglio & F Maccheroni & M Marinacci, 2012.
"Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000376, David K. Levine.
- Lehrer, Ehud & Teper, Roee, 2011. "Justifiable preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 762-774, March.
- Ehud Lehrer, 2012. "Partially Specified Probabilities: Decisions and Games," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 70-100, February.
- Yaron Azrieli, 2009. "On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 209-219, June.
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