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Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Fudenberg, Drew

    () (Department of Economics, Harvard University)

  • Kamada, Yuichiro

    () (Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley)

Abstract

Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games, when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
  • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1362
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Friedenberg, Amanda, 2012. "Forward induction reasoning revisited," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
    2. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
    3. Esponda, Ignacio, 2013. "Rationalizable conjectural equilibrium: A framework for robust predictions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    4. Michael D. Ryall, 2003. "Subjective Rationality, Self--Confirming Equilibrium, and Corporate Strategy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(7), pages 936-949, July.
    5. Adam Brandenburger & Amanda Friedenberg, 2014. "Intrinsic Correlation in Games," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 4, pages 59-111 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:eee:gamebe:v:109:y:2018:i:c:p:364-381 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Schipper, Burkhard C, 2018. "Discovery and Equilibrium in Games with Unawareness," MPRA Paper 86300, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Emiliano Catonini & Giacomo Lanzani & Massimo Marinacci, 2017. "Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confi rming Equilibrium in Sequential Games," Working Papers 607, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. Battigalli, P. & Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M., 2016. "Analysis of information feedback and selfconfirming equilibrium," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 40-51.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Rationalizablity; common knowledge; extensive-form games; self-confirming equilibrium;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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