# Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

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## Abstract

## Suggested Citation

**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.

*RePEc:els:esrcls:032*

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## Other versions of this item:

- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"
**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.

- Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999.
"
**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics. - Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "undated".
"
**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. - Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999.
"
**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. - Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"
**Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. - Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999.
"
**Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium**," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.

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**Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games**," Papers 14-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.

**Full references**(including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

## More about this item

### JEL classification:

**C7**- Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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