The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability
Two approaches have been proposed in the literature to reﬁne the rationalizability solution concept: either assuming that players make small errors when playing their strategies, or assuming that there is a small amount of payoff uncertainty. We show that both approaches lead to the same reﬁnement if errors are made according to the concept of weakly perfect rationalizability, and there is payoff uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg [J. of Econ. Theory 52 (1990), 243-267]. For both cases, the strategies that survive are obtained by starting with one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by many rounds of elimination of strictly dominated strategies
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