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Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines

Author

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  • Ana MAULEON

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

  • Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES))

Abstract

We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information which makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique outcome is always inefficient

Suggested Citation

  • Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  • Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001021
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    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-21.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2005. "Reinterpreting the meaning of breakdown," Game Theory and Information 0501004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Juan Vidal-Puga, 2008. "Delay in the alternating-offers model of bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 457-474, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bargaining; alternating-offers; deadlines; complete infomation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation

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