Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the 2-person bargaining problem. In this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different ways, (for example, because the pie is an amount of money and there is a smallest money unit), any partition can be obtained as the result of a subgame perfect equilibrium if the time interval between successive offers is sufficiently small.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:188-201. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.