Alliances and negotiations
A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances, and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the composite player affect the bargaining outcome. In particular we find that unanimity procedures lead to `more aggressive' behaviour than majority procedures, and that procedures which introduce minimum safeguards for the members of an alliance may result in agreements that are worse than without those safeguards.
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