Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty
The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players’ optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players’ strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players’ behaviour and modify the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
|Order Information:|| Email: |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Merlo, Antonio, 1996.
"Bargaining over governments in a stochastic environment,"
7476, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Merlo, Antonio, 1997. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 101-31, February.
- Merlo, A., 1992. "Bargaining Over Governments in a Stochastic Environment," Working Papers 92-55, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1995. "R&D Cooperation and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 1154, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1992.
"A noncooperative model of collective decision making: a multilateral bargaining approach,"
Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series
qt8ch813x0, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1992. "A Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt1p67k0dp, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L., 1990. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers 819, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2004.
"Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 385-399, March.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Harrie de Swart & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, 2005. "A new model of coalition formation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 129-154, 09.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Negotiating on water: insights from non-cooperative bargaining theory," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(02), pages 329-349, April.
- Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1999. "Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 561-575.
- Eraslan, Hulya & Merlo, Antonio, 2002.
"Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 31-48, March.
- Gordon C. Rausser & Leo K. Simon, 1992.
"Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: Multi-Lateral Bargaining Approach, A,"
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications
90-gatt22, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University.
- Gordon C. Rausser & Leo K. Simon, 1992. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: Multi-Lateral Bargaining Approach, A," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 90-gatt22, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Adams, Gregory & Rausser, Gordon & Simon, Leo, 1996. "Modelling multilateral negotiations: An application to California water policy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 97-111, July.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Sophie Thoyer & Sylvie Morardet & Patrick Rio & Leo Simon & Rachael Goodhue & Gordon Rausser, 2001. "A Bargaining Model to Simulate Negotiations Between Water Users," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 4(2), pages 6.
- Inderst, Roman, 1998.
"Multi-Issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda,"
Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications
98-35, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Manzini, Paola & Mariotti, Marco, 2003. "A bargaining model of voluntary environmental agreements," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2725-2736, December.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005.
"Applications of negotiation theory to water issues,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3641, The World Bank.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues," Working Papers 2005.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2006. "Applications of negotiation theory to water issues," Working Papers 2006_09, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Paola MAnzini & Marco Mariotti, 2000.
"Alliances and Negotiations,"
Game Theory and Information
- In, Younghwan & Serrano, Roberto, 2003.
"Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining (II): unrestricted agendas,"
Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 325-331, June.
- Younghwan In & Roberto Serrano, 2002. "Agenda Restrictions in Multi-Issue Bargaining (II): Unrestricted Agendas," Departmental Working Papers wp0206, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Chaim Fershtman, 1986.
"The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining,"
689, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ma, Ching-To Albert & Manove, Michael, 1993.
"Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1313-39, November.
- Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove, 1991. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Papers 0007, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 125-134, March.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, H�lya & Merlo, Antonio, 2007.
"Bicameralism and Government Formation,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science,
now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 227-252, August.
- Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
- Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
- Simon, Leo K. & Goodhue, Rachael E. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Thoyer, Sophie & Morardet, Sylvie & Rio, Patrick, 2007. "Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy," Monographs, University of California, Davis, Giannini Foundation, number 37630.
- Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
- Gneezy, Uri & Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E., 2003. "Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 347-368, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6424. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.