Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3642, The World Bank.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2006. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2006_08, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- van den Brink, René & van der Laan, Gerard & Moes, Nigel, 2012.
"Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 388-403.
- Rene van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Nigel Moes, 2010. "Fair Agreements for Sharing International Rivers with Multiple Springs and Externalities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-096/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Cristophe Péreau, 2010. "Coalition formation and bargaining power: theory and application to international negotiations on public goods," Working Papers 1017, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
- Bosetti, Valentina & Carraro, Carlo & De Cian, Enrica & Duval, Romain & Massetti, Emanuele & Tavoni, Massimo, 2009.
"The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model,"
Sustainable Development Papers
54281, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Harold Houba, 2008.
"Computing Alternating Offers And Water Prices In Bilateral River Basin Management,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(03), pages 257-278.
- Harold Houba, 2006. "Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-095/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009.
"The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model,"
OECD Economics Department Working Papers
702, OECD Publishing.
- Carlo Carraro & Valentina Bosetti & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions: a game theoretic approach using the WITCH Model," Working Papers 2009_28, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Carlo Carraro & Emanuele Massetti, 2010. "International Climate Change Negotiations: Lessons from Theory," Chapters, in: Emilio Cerdá Tena & Xavier Labandeira (ed.), Climate Change Policies, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jung Hur, 2012. "Conflicts And Delays In International Trade Agreements," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 57(02), pages 1-20.
- Carmen Marchiori, 2010. "Concern for Fairness and Incentives in Water Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 553-571, April.
- Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2015.
"International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 855-872, December.
- Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-157/II, Tinbergen Institute.
- Andrew G. Brown & Robert M. Stern, 2009.
"Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Globalization And International Trade Policies, chapter 5, pages 109-149,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Andrew G. Brown & Robert M. Stern, 2007. "Concepts Of Fairness In The Global Trading System," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 293-318, August.
- Andrew Brown & Robert Stern, 2005. "Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System," Working Papers 544, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
More about this item
Keywords
; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2005-06-05 (Business Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alberto Prina Cerai The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Alberto Prina Cerai to update the entry or send us the correct address (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/feemmit.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fem/femwpa/2005.66.html