Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness
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- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3642, The World Bank.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2005.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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- Alejandro Caparrós & Jean-Cristophe Péreau, 2010. "Coalition formation and bargaining power: theory and application to international negotiations on public goods," Working Papers 1017, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC.
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- Harold Houba, 2008.
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- Harold Houba, 2006. "Computing Alternating Offers and Water Prices in Bilateral River Basin Management," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-095/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009.
"The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model,"
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- Carlo Carraro & Valentina Bosetti & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions: a game theoretic approach using the WITCH Model," Working Papers 2009_28, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Carlo Carraro & Emanuele Massetti, 2010. "International Climate Change Negotiations: Lessons from Theory," Chapters, in: Emilio Cerdá Tena & Xavier Labandeira (ed.), Climate Change Policies, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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- Carmen Marchiori, 2010. "Concern for Fairness and Incentives in Water Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 553-571, April.
- Harold Houba & Gerard Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2015.
"International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 855-872, December.
- Harold Houba & Gerard van der Laan & Yuyu Zeng, 2013. "International Environmental Agreements for River Sharing Problems," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-157/II, Tinbergen Institute.
- Andrew G. Brown & Robert M. Stern, 2009.
"Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Globalization And International Trade Policies, chapter 5, pages 109-149,
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- Andrew G. Brown & Robert M. Stern, 2007. "Concepts Of Fairness In The Global Trading System," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 293-318, August.
- Andrew Brown & Robert Stern, 2005. "Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System," Working Papers 544, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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