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Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule

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  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    (Wageningen University)

Abstract

Previous work on the formation and stability of cartels has focused on the case of identical players. This assumption is very restrictive in many economic environments. This paper analyses stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called "optimal sharing" which stabilises all cartels that are possibly stable under any rule. Under optimal sharing the grand coalition is the unique stable cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called "non-essentiality" and determine the set of stable cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse cartel stability under optimal sharing in simple public goods game with heterogeneous players. My results show – in contrast to earlier findings for identical players – that large coalitions may well be stable.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans-Peter Weikard, 2005. "Cartel Stability under an Optimal Sharing Rule," Working Papers 2005.77, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.77
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cartel stability; Coalition formation games with spillovers; Partition function approach; Optimal sharing rule;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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