Coalition formation and bargaining power: theory and application to international negotiations on public goods
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordsgame theory; bargaining; coalition formation; climate change; international environmental agreements.;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
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