Coalition formation and bargaining power: theory and application to international negotiations on public goods
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Michael Finus & Alejandro CaparrÃ³s (ed.), 2015.
"Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation,"
Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15345.
- Michael Finus, 2001. "Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2118.
- Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005.
"Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
3642, The World Bank.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2005.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2006. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2006_08, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993.
"Strategies for the international protection of the environment,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008.
"Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin,"
2008-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin," Working Papers 2008-11, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999.
"A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Matthew McGinty, 2007. "International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 45-62, January.
More about this item
Keywordsgame theory; bargaining; coalition formation; climate change; international environmental agreements.;
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
- F59 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - Other
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipp:wpaper:1017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adelheid Holl). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ippcses.html .