IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Coalition formation and bargaining power: theory and application to international negotiations on public goods

  • Alejandro Caparrós
  • Jean-Cristophe Péreau

This paper studies the role of bargaining power in coalition formation when two groups of substantially different agents negotiate over a public good with positive or negative spillovers. Both types of agent are allowed to form coalitions before the negotiations start. The forming of coalitions does or does not increase bargaining power, depending on the type of public good and the impact on the agents not participating in the equilibrium agreements. After analyzing the general game we apply it to North-South negotiations. For a public good with positive spillovers, such as climate change abatement, southern countries increase their bargaining power by forming a coalition when a partial agreement induces larger indirect gains for northern countries not participating in the agreement than for non-participating southern countries. We obtain similar results, with the opposite sign, for the formation of a northern coalition.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC in its series Working Papers with number 1017.

in new window

Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ipp:wpaper:1017
Contact details of provider: Web page:

More information through EDIRC

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipp:wpaper:1017. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adelheid Holl)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.