Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach
In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We show that the welfare of the signatories does not increase monotonically with respect to the number of signatories. We provide an analytical solution of the leadership model. In particular, we find that the unique stable IEA consist of either two, three or four signatories if the number of countries is greater than 4. Furthermore, we show that the welfare of the signatories is almost at its lowest level when the IEA is stable. While in our model countries’ choice variable is emissions, we extend our results to the case where the choice variable is abatement efforts.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2001|
|Date of revision:||Feb 2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 1455, de Maisonneuve Blvd, Montréal, Québec, H3G 1M8|
Phone: (514) 848-3900
Fax: (514) 848-4536
Web page: http://economics.concordia.ca
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991.
"Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
- Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999.
"A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 0068, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
- Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers 68, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983.
"On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997.
"The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., "undated". "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- S. De Cara & Gilles Rotillon, 2003. "Multigreenhouse gas international agreements," THEMA Working Papers 2003-13, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
- Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1998. "International Institutions and Environmental Policy: International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 561-572, May.
- Ioannidis, Alexis & Papandreou, Andreas & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, 2000. "International Environmental Agreements: a Literature Review," Cahiers de recherche 0008, GREEN.
- Hanley, Nick & Shogren, Jason, 2007. "Introduction," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 73-74, August.
- Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:crd:wpaper:04001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Economics Department)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.